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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Not Reversinq The Magistrate's Order Suppressinq 
Evidence That Scott Was Driving Under The Influence 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate concluded that Officer Hagstrom exceeded his legal 
authority by stopping Scott outside the Sandpoint city limits, reasoning that 
because Officer Hagstrom did not activate his lights until after he had left the city 
limits he was only "following" Scott and not "pursuing" him. (R., pp. 48-49.) The 
district court affirmed on the same basis. (R., pp. 86-87.) These courts erred 
because there is no legal requirement that the officer activate his lights to be in 
"fresh pursuit" and because even if the officer exceeded his statutory authority in 
stopping Scott there was no constitutional violation (and thus no grounds for 
suppression) because the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of 
speeding, which blossomed into probable cause for DUI. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
4-1 5. j 
On appeal Scott contends that the lower courts were correct in concluding 
that Officer Hagstrom was not in fresh pursuit, contending that the question of 
fresh pursuit is a factual question. (Respondent's brief, pp. 5-8.) This argument 
fails because the lower courts clearly concluded that some effort to detain (in this 
case activation of lights) was a legal prerequisite to being in "fresh pursuit" -- an 
error of law, not fact. 
Scott next contends that the state's argument that he failed to show any 
violation of his constitutional (as opposed to statutory) rights is not preserved 
and, if preserved, is erroneous. (Respondent's brief, pp. 9-10.) The argument 
that this issue was not preserved fails because the question of whether Scott was 
entitled to suppression was obviously raised by Scott and decided by the lower 
courts. Scott's argument on the merits likewise fails because it is directly 
contrary to applicable statute and precedent. 
B. The Lower Courts Erred By Holding That Activation Of Lights Is A 
Prerequisite To Being In Fresh Pursuit 
Scott contends that the magistrate's findings of fact are entitled to 
deference. (Respondent's brief, pp. 6-7.) This is a truism with which the state 
has no dispute. See, e.g., State v. Hedgecock, 147 Idaho 580, 583, 212 P.3d 
1010, 1013 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When reviewing the decision on a suppression 
motion, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous, while exercising free review over the application of constitutional 
standards to those facts."). The state contests none of the magistrate's findings 
of fact, including when the officer activated his lights and that the officer could 
have activated his lights immediately upon seeing the infraction, while still within 
the city limits, the facts Scott emphasizes in his brief. (See Respondent's brief, 
pp. 6-7.) The state's argument, however, is that activation of the lights within the 
city limits is not a legal prerequisite to fresh pursuit under the statute (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 5-10), a legal proposition on which Scott takes no position on appeal 
(see, generally, Respondent's brief). Because the applicable legal authority 
shows that a pursuit may be initiated without activating lights or otherwise 
signaling the suspect to stop (see Appellant's brief, pp. 5-10 (and cases cited)), 
the lower courts erred as a matter of law. The facts found by the trial court show 
that Officer Hagstrom initiated his pursuit without any delay, much less without 
unreasonable delay, and therefore the lower courts erred in concluding that 
Officer Hagstrom exceeded his legal authority when he stopped Scott. 
C. The Issue Of Whether Scott Is Entitled To Suppression Of Evidence Is 
Properlv Before This Court 
Scott contends that, "because the state did not argue against suppression 
as an appropriate remedy" below, the issue is waived. (Respondent's brief, p. 9.) 
This argument fails on the record because the prosecutor did argue that Scott 
was not entitled to suppression (although the prosecutor used the word 
"dismissal" instead of "suppression") for a violation of the fresh pursuit laws. (Tr., 
p. 23, Ls. 10-15 (arguing Scott was not entitled to dismissal even if the fresh 
pursuit laws were violated).) Scott's argument also ignores the fact that Scott 
himself raised the issue and the magistrate decided it. Because the issue was 
raised to and decided by the trial court, it is properly before this Court on appeal. 
An issue is preserved for appeal if it is presented to the court for decision 
and the court has decided it. State v. DuValt, 131 ldaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 
644 (1998); State v. Green, 130 ldaho 503, 506, 943 P.2d 929, 932 (1997). 
Scott moved to "suppress the evidence gathered against him" at least in part 
because, he claimed, the "extraterritorial stop of the Defendant was . . . contrary 
to I.C. [§I 67-2337(2), (3), and (5) ...." (R., p. 37.) At the hearing counsel for 
Scott (not current counsel) stated that the motion to suppress was "premised as 
indicated on Title 67 and also deals with questions of fresh pursuit." (Tr., p. 20, 
Ls. 10-12.) The trial court concluded that fresh pursuit did not justify the stop and 
granted the motion, suppressing the evidence. (R., pp. 48-49.) Because the 
issue of whether Scott was entitled to suppression for a violation of the fresh 
pursuit laws was clearly before the court on Scott's motion, and because the trial 
court clearly decided that issue, whether Scott is entitled to suppression for the 
claimed violation of the fresh pursuit statutes is an issue preserved for appellate 
review. 
D. Because Officer Hagstrom Did Not Violate Scott's Constitutional Rights 
Scott Was Not Entitled To Suppression 
In its brief on appeal the state argued that there is no exclusionary rule 
generally applicable to statutory violations. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-1 1 (and 
cases cited).) The state further contended that the legislature did not provide an 
exclusionary rule for violation of the fresh pursuit laws, but instead specifically 
provided that a violation of those laws would not render an otherwise lawful 
arrest unlawful. (Appellant's brief, p. 12 (and statute cited).) Scott does not 
dispute either of these propositions. (See, generally, Respondent's brief.) It is 
therefore undisputed before this Court that Scott is not entitled to suppression for 
a violation of the fresh pursuit statutes, unless such a violation was also a 
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Application of the relevant legal precedents shows that there was no 
violation of Scott's constitutional rights. In Virsinia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 
(2008)' the Supreme Court of the United States held that an arrest rendered 
illegal by Virginia law was not a constitutional violation entitling Moore to 
suppression of evidence so long as the arrest met constitutional standards. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13 (and other cases cited).) A traffic stop based on 
reasonable suspicion the driver has committed an infraction is constitutionally 
reasonable. See Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); State v. 
McCarthv, 133 Idaho 119, 124, 982 P.2d 954, 959 (Ct. App. 1999). Because the 
state proved that the stop in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion 
that Scott was speeding the stop was constitutional. Because there was no 
violation of Scott's constitutional rights, the lower courts erred in suppressing 
evidence associated with that stop. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to reverse the district court's order on appeal 
and remand to the magistrate for further proceedings. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 201 0. 
Deputy Attorney ~ e n e r d l  V 
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